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Migration Crisis and Its Impact 
on the Internal Situation in Turkey
Abstract
The aim of this article is to discuss the impact of the migration crisis 
on the social situation in Turkey. The article consists of three parts. In 
the fi rst part, the author discusses the role of Turkey in overcoming the 
migration crisis along with statistics concerning the number of refugees 
in this country. The second part presents the state’s policy towards Syrian 
refugees and its evolution. The third part includes an analysis of the 
consequences which the migration crisis and the infl ux of refugees has 
caused in the socio-political situation of Turkey. This part also contains 
an analysis of public opinion surveys on the attitude of Turks towards the 
refugee community.
Keywords: Migration Crisis, Turkey, Refugees, Syria
Introduction
The issue of migration, regardless of the reasons, is one of the main 
challenges of the contemporary world. Migrations affect almost all 
spheres of social and economic life. Foreigners are usually seen as 
a contrast to the citizens of a nation-state and a challenge to the integrity 
of the local community. The host population may treat them as a factor 
which interferes with economic, cultural or political stability. Analyzes 
on migration show that, among others, local communities perceive 
migrants as people who distort the labor market, cause lowering of wages 
and affect the unemployment rates of the local community.1 The infl ux of 
1* Dominika Liszkowska – Koszalin University of Technology, 
e-mail: dominika_liszkowska@wp.pl, ORCID: 0000-0001-6312-341X.
1 A. Llanos-Antczak, Problemy społeczno-ekonomiczne jako jedne z najgroźniejszych 
wyzwań dla bezpieczeństwa europejskiego w XXI wieku (Socio-Economic Problems as One 
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immigrants also causes dissatisfaction with the host community, primarily 
due to their predispositions to commit crimes, assimilation problems and 
being perceived as a threat to national identity. 
The view according to which migrants can be perceived as a security 
threat has been continuously present for many years. According to 
Philippe Bourbeau, issues which have become particularly disturbing 
include: (1) considering the concept of migration in a collective sense, 
and thus determining its impact on creating an existential threat to the 
security of the state and society; (2) recognizing the phenomenon of 
immigration as threatening to state’s security; and (3) the accompanying 
effects of political practice that have undergone signifi cant and even 
surprising changes.2
The securitization of the concept of migration implies, for example, 
its construction as a matter of security threat of great and existential 
signifi cance for the Member States of the European Union and European 
culture as a whole.3 Therefore, “societal security” has become one of the 
main areas of security addressed by representatives of the Copenhagen 
School. Proponents of the conventional-critical approach believe, for 
example, that security can contribute to a regression in the debate about 
whether immigrants and refugees are in fact posing a threat to the state. 
This situation may in fact motivate groups of nationalists who explain 
their behavior towards migrants as an attempt to defend their own 
“societal security”.
Barry Buzan pointed out three possible threats to the societal security 
of local society in a given state.4 The fi rst of them, horizontal competition, 
transforms the identity of a local population through the cultural and 
linguistic infl uences of the neighboring culture. According to Buzan, 
another threat is vertical competition. It takes place through the inclusion 
of the culture of a given group in the broader defi nition of culture, or 
through the disintegration of broadly understood culture into smaller 
elements. Finally, the last factor threatening the identity of the society 
and its security is migration which changes the structure of the entire 
society. Immigrants form a cultural, religious, linguistic (and sometimes 
of the Most Dangerous Challenges to European Security in the 21st Century), „Studia Eu-
ropejskie – Studies in European Affairs”, no. 4/2019, pp. 49–52.
2  P. Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order, 
London/New York 2011, p. 1.
3  V. Lalić, P. Ćeranić, Securitization of Migration in European Union and the Role of 
Private Security Firms, „Security Dialogues”, no. 1/2019, p. 48.
4  B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Colo-
rado/London 1998, p. 121.
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racial) minority in a given country and change its entire social structure 
(specifi cally ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic elements of the 
population5). In cases of violation of generally accepted norms and values, 
the citizens of the host country may see immigrants as a threat to their 
own societal security, and the state may defend itself against migration by 
using the argument of “otherness” of immigrants.
It can be assumed, however, that in the case of Turkey, the issue of 
securitization of societal security is, however, of secondary importance. 
Refugees are perceived by the host community mainly in the context of 
being a threat to social security (the access to the labor market, public 
services – including health services, high costs of maintaining refugees) 
and in this particular context they consider the legitimacy of the presence 
of refugees in Turkey. The aim of this article is to verify the hypothesis 
stated above as well as to present the impact of the migration crisis and 
the infl ow of Syrian people on the situation in Turkey. Another objective 
of this analysis is to answer the following questions: How has Turkey’s 
policy towards refugees and asylum seekers from Syria changed, and how 
has it affected Turks’ attitude towards Syrians? What consequences have 
the migration crisis and the increase in the number of admitted refugees 
caused in Turkey? How do Turks and the Turkish state jusify their 
approach to refugees and what do they see as the greatest threat to social 
security and security of the state?
Through the investigation of social reality we can refer to many metho-
dological categories.6 In case of this analysis, it seems especially important 
to pay attention to the interrelationship of the studied phenomena. It is 
crucial to investigate the way in which the infl ux of immigrants to Turkey 
has affected the situation of the local community and its approach towar-
ds helping refugees. In this way, it may be possible to conclude whether 
the totality of changes and relations that have taken place in Turkey over 
the past years have characteristics of individual (i.e. whether the proces-
ses can be described as identical to those occurring in other countries) or 
particular nature (specifi c only in this case). To achieve this objective, it 
seems reasonable to use the technique of the analysis of source material 
and secondary analysis of quantitative and qualitative existing data. Re-
ports from opinion polls also hold an important place in the material used 
for this research.
5  Y. A. Stivachtis, International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security, 
„Journal of Humanities & Social Science”, vol. 2, no. 1/2008, p. 3.
6  J. Sztumski, Wstęp do metod i technik badań społecznych (Introduction to Methods 
and Techniques of Social Research), Katowice 2019, pp. 27–28.
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Migration Crisis and the Increase 
in the Number of Refugees in Turkey
The issue of migration and better control of the fl ow of refugees and 
asylum seekers has become the main theme in Turkey’s relations with the 
European Union in recent years. In December 2013, both partners signed 
a Readmission Agreement, which entered into force on October 1, 2014. 
The aim of the agreement was to strengthen cooperation between the 
parties with a perspective of effective combating of illegal immigration. It 
set out procedures for establishing the identity of people residing illegally 
in Turkey or one of the EU countries, as well as for returns and facilitating 
transit. As the migration crisis intensifi ed and Turkey was identifi ed as 
a strategic partner in the attempt to overcome it, mutual cooperation in the 
fi eld of migration and bilateral relations entered a new stage. This resulted 
in the signing of an EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016,7 which was 
to ensure deeper relations and searching for a solution to the migration 
crisis through a bilateral commitment. Turkey decided to accept the rapid 
return of all immigrants who did not require international protection 
from Turkey to Greece and to take back all those irregular migrants who 
were detained in Turkey’s territorial waters. Both sides agreed to the 
further strengthening of measures to combat immigrant smugglers and 
welcomed NATO’s8 fi ndings in the Aegean Sea.
Turkey’s actions, combined with the actions of the member states, 
almost immediately blocked the mass fl ow of immigrants by the so-called 
Balkan Route on the territory of the European Union. The number of 
daily journeys dropped by 97% from 10 000 in one day in October 2015 
to 83 (on March, 21 2016). Also, the number of deaths in the Aegean Sea 
dropped signifi cantly from 1175 in the 20 months before the declaration 
to 310.9 Turkey, therefore, included both the possibilities and the tools 
that proved necessary to overcome the crisis. At the same time, however, 
the number of refugees staying in Turkey increased. According to 
UNHCR10 data from November 30, 2019, the country currently has the 
largest population of refugees and asylum seekers in the world, reaching 
7  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliment, the Euro-
pean Council and the Council, First Report on the progress made in the implementa-
tion of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM(2016) 231 fi nal, Brussels 20.04.2016.
8  North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
9  European Commission, EU-Turkey Statement Three years on, March 2019, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/fi les/what-we-do/policies/europe-
an-agenda-migration/20190318_eu-turkey-three-years-on_en.pdf (access 9.03.2020).
10  The UN Refugee Agency.
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almost 4 Million. The largest group are citizens of Syria (3.6 Million), 
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Figure 2. The Increase in the Number of Refugees in Turkey (2012–2019)
Source of data: UNHCR – Turkey Stats.
Turkey’s Policy Towards Syrian Refugees
In the fi rst years of the gradual appearance of Syrian refugees on Turkish 
territories, the government’s activities could be described as proactive.11 
Individual state policy entities at the central as well as provincial level, 
provided both the support and numerous benefi ts to refugees and asylum 
seekers. In order to use public services such as social assistance, health 
11  S. Aydın-Düzgit, F. Keyman, K. Biehl, Changing Parameters of Migration 
Cooperation: Beyond the EU–Turkey Deal?, Istanbul 2019, p. 5.
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care and education, newcomers from Syria were required to register. By 
2013, the Turkish authorities had registered 225 000 refugees so their 
population was not diffi cult to control. The government could focus on 
the crisis response policy, the main element of which was the creation 
and operation of Temporary Accommodation Camps (TACs) and taking 
into account primarily the housing and nutritional needs of refugees 
and asylum seekers. In the provinces bordering Syria, all newcomers 
were offered free medical care and education (in Temporary Education 
Centers – TEC).
In November 2014, the Syrian population in Turkey represented 2.1% 
of the total population of this country. However, this percentage increased 
over time and reached 2.5% by September 2015.12 In turn, in ten Turkish 
cities near the Syrian border (the population of which is estimated at 
10 million people) those numbers were much higher (as a result of the 
fact that there were 1.2 million refugees located in this region). Thus, in 
the three border regions, the Syrian refugee community constituted the 
highest percentage of its population in Turkey (from 8–14%13). This rapid 
population growth left, among others, a heavy burden on health services, 
both in terms of human resources and logistics. Only in 2015, over half 
a million Syrian patients were transferred from refugee camps to public 
hospitals, and about 35 000 Syrian children were born in them (Ministry 
of Health data). Hospitals in the bordering regions began to dedicate 
30–40% of their capacity to help Syrian patients. This situation caused 
dissatisfaction of the local community and contributed to the creation 
of, among others, health centers exclusively for refugees (in which social 
workers, psychologists and translators were employed in addition to 
medical staff). In bordering cities, the number of doctors increased 
multiple times over one year (Şanlıurfa – from 156 to 380, Gaziantep – 
from 65 to 17914).
Only at the beginning of 2015, the Turkish state spent about 6 billion 
USD on refugee assistance (at a time when external assistance amounted 
to 300 million USD). This sum was intended for food, various services 
and basic necessities such as medicines, clothing, shelter and housing.15 
12  P.E. Ekmekci, Syrian Refugees, Health and Migration Legislation in Turkey, „Jour-
nal of Immigrant and Minority Health”, no. 19, vol. 1434–1441/2017, p. 7.
13  Y.K. Bagir, Impact of the Syrian refugee infl ux on Turkish native workers: An ethnic 
enclave approach,”Central Bank Review”, vol. 18, no. 4/2018, p. 131.
14  P.E. Ekmekci, op. cit., p. 7. 
15  X.V. Del Carpio, M. Wagner, The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Labor 
Market, „Policy Research Working Paper”, no. WPS7402/2015, p. 8.
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The open door policy16 and the rapid increase in the number of refugees 
initiated in 2014 resulted, apart from the huge costs, also in the inability 
to admit them all to TAC centers. Syrians began to move to other parts 
of Turkey. Signifi cant clusters were formed not only near the border with 
Syria, but in most of the Turkish regions and cities (the highest rates, 
among others, in Istanbul, Izmir and Bursa). As a result of the growing 
challenges related to the Syrian refugee issue, government’s policy has 
gradually moved from a phase of temporary crisis management towards 
a long-term integration approach. The actions were focused on taking the 
necessary measures to adapt migrants to the economic and social life of 
the country.17 At a time when the population of refugees living in the TAC 
fell below the number of Syrians permanently residing in Turkish cities 
(in January 2019, there were 13 such large-scale camps accommodating 
a total of 143 55818), the government provided them with help to rent 
accomodation, as well as the necessary resources. Unlike the EU’s 
countries, however, Turkey has not developed a separate policy on the 
use of public goods for people under temporary international protection. 
Therefore, the policy towards refugees from Syria is based on an approach 
to using public services in the same way as for the citizens of the state.19
On the other hand, some Syrian families receive subsidies under 
Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) and the Conditional Cash Transfer 
for Education (CCTE) programs developed in Turkey’s agreement with 
the European Union in March 2016. These programs helped refugees 
meet some of the social and educational needs. Those refugee families 
qualifying for ESSN support receive 120 TRY (around 19 euros20) per 
person per month (as part of the transfer of funds to a special debit 
card21). In addition, Syrian families also receive transfers paid quarterly 
(“top-ups”) depending on the size of the family. Refugees with severe 
16  S. Kınıklıoğlu, Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Changing Attitudes and Fortunes, „SWP 
Comment”, no. 5/2020, p. 1.
17  The Division for Sustainable Development Goals (DSDG), Turkey’s 2nd VNR 
2019 Sustainable Development Goals “Strong Ground towards Common Goals”, p. 44, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/23862Turkey_VNR_110 
719.pdf (access 10.03.2020).
18  The Asylum Information Database (AIDA), Housing Turkey, https://www.asy-
lumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/housing-1 (access 10.03.2020).
19  The Division for Sustainable Development Goals (DSDG), op. cit., p. 44.
20  European Commission, Questions and answers: Support for refugees in Turkey 
through the Emergency Social Safety Net, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/press-
corner/detail/en/QANDA_19_6212 (access 1.06.2020).
21  World Food Programme, The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN). Help-
ing Refugees in Turkey, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
WFP-0000104792.pdf (access 1.06.2020).
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disabilities can expect additional 600 TRY for special expenditures.22 
The Turkish government has also made some efforts to improve the 
living conditions of Syrian refugees under temporary protection. These 
efforts included undertaking measures to provide vocational training 
and language courses (via Turkish employment agencies and chambers 
of commerce). In December 2017, work permit fee was reduced from 
537 TRY (97 USD) to 200 TRY (36 USD) (increased in the meantime to 
372 TRY (67 USD23).
The support for Syrians is, however, often insuffi cient. As a result, 
they look for jobs that can provide them with additional income 
(mainly in the sectors of agriculture, industry and small enterprises,24 
in the textile and clothing sectors, as well as in education, construction 
and services25). It is estimated that the number of Syrians who took up 
employment in Turkey is between 500 000 and one million, and by the 
end of 2018 only 65 000 work permits were issued (according to the 
Interior Minister of Turkey26). Due to the fact that most refugees do 
not have a work permit, they participate in the Turkish labor market 
illegally (for example, as many as 92% of Syrians employed in the 
agricultural sector and 20.7% of Syrian educational workers work in 
the informal market).
Informal employment is primarily associated with low wages (well 
below the statutory minimum wage), as well as poor working conditions 
and exploitation, especially referring to children and women. Some 
Turkish employers eagerly employ refugees in their companies in order to 
avoid paying higher wages and social security contributions.27 As Burcu 
Toğral Koca notes, numerous studies and analyzes show that refugees in 
Turkey live in uncertain situations. They are victims of human traffi cking 
and economic exploitation, as well as forced to prostitution and begging. 
Over 70% of refugees live in extreme or moderate poverty.28 Some of 
22  Ibidem.
23  I. Leghtas, Insecure Future: Deportations and Lack of Legal Work for Refugees in 
Turkey, p. 11, https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2019/9/18/insecure-fu-
ture-deportations-and-lack-of-legal-work-for-refugees-in-turkey (access 1.06.2020).
24  P.E. Ekmekci, op. cit., p. 9.




27  U. Farooq, N. Bulos, Anti-refugee sentiment grows in Turkey as government begins 
to send Syrians back, https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-07-25/turkey-
shows-signs-of-exasperation-over-refugees (access 1.06.2020).
28  K. Kirişci, G. Uysal Kolasin, op. cit.
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them do not have access to apartments and therefore occupy parks and 
abandoned buildings.29
Over the past fi ve years, as a result of the process of gradual ghettoisation 
of refugees, there has also been a nearly six-fold increase in the rate of 
crime committed by this community. Living apart from the Turks, Syrian 
refugees captured some districts of Turkish cities (including Istanbul). 
Although the incidents of violence were rather negligible, xenophobic 
monitoring NGOs30 indicate that since the beginning of the Syrian war, 
over 70 spontaneous hatred-promoting campaigns against Syrians have 
been organized in Turkey, which have received positive feedback from 
social media users.31
Attacks on representatives of the Syrian community began to 
spread beyond the Internet over time. In early July 2019, human rights 
organizations reported a wave of attacks on companies owned by Syrians 
in Istanbul. Some representatives of this community also noted that 
apartment owners are less willing to rent them fl ats. They began to 
blame the Turkish media for this, because they believe that refugees were 
portrayed in a negative light.
The Impact of the Migration Crisis on the Socio-political 
Situation in Turkey and Turks’ Approach Towards 
Syrian Refugees
Initially, the Turkish society showed a high degree of tolerance for 
Syrian refugees and asylum seekers. It resulted, among others, from the 
rhetoric of the authorities [particularly strong during the offi ce of Prime 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (2014–2016)] and pro-government media. 
The admission of Syrian refugees was argued as an expression of a kind 
of “neo-ottoman paternalism” towards the Arab population and Turkey’s 
humanitarian duty towards fellow believers.32 The image of the state was 
contested by the attitude of the West, but at the same time, by exposing its 
moral advantage, it positively infl uenced Turkey’s image in the Muslim 
world.
29  B.T. Koca, Syrian refugees in Turkey: from “guests” to “enemies”?, „New Perspec-
tives on Turkey”, no. 54/2016, p. 66.
30  Non-government Organizations.
31  M. Chudziak, M. Marszewski, Kłopotliwi goście. Tureckie plany rozwiązania 
kwestii uchodźców syryjskich (Troublesome guests. Turkish plans to resolve the issue of Syrian 
refugees), „Komentarze OSW”, no. 310/2019, pp. 2–3.
32  Ibidem, p. 3.
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The Turkish government’s decision to gradually close refugee camps 
(only in 2018 six camps were closed down33) resulted also in a decrease 
in the population living in the camps. At the same time, consequences of 
this decision increased the number of refugees moving to the largest cities 
in Turkey. More than half of the 3.6 million Syrians in January 2019 were 
registered in 4 out of the 81 Turkish provinces (Istanbul, Şanlıurfa, Hatay 
and Gaziantep34). Only in Istanbul, the number of refugees reached 1 mil-
lion, only half of whom (548 00035) are offi cially registered.36 A signifi cant 
proportion of refugees also continue to stay in the cities near the border – 
Gaziantep (443 000), Şanlıurfa (431 000) and Hatay (430 000).37 The bene-
fi ciaries of temporary protection correspond to 21.4% of the population 
in Gaziantep, 22.2% in Şanlıurfa, 27.3% in Hatay and 82.2% in Kilis.38 
According to Suat Kınıklıoğlu, this situation changed the perception of Sy-
rians to “urban refugees”, because as many as 98% of them began to reside in 
cities39 (this is not confi rmed by FAO’s data from December 2017; according 
to FAO, 93.5% refugees from Syria reside amongst host communities in ru-
ral, semi-rural and urban areas40). As David Lepeska notes, Syrians have be-
come an integral part of Istanbul and other Turkish cities, and in accordance 
with the Turkish Ministry of Commerce, they contributed, among others, to 
the creation of more than 15 000 new companies in the country employing 
nearly 100 000 people (including Turks41). The issue of their return to their 
homeland began to be addressed more and more often by both individual 
offi cials and members of Turkish society. 
The attitude towards the Syrian brothers has also changed over time. 
This situation has been affected by economic problems that began to 
appear in Turkey (the value of the Turkish currency dropped sharply as 
both infl ation and unemployment increased), as well as social tensions, 
especially among  the working class competing with refugees for modest 
33  The Asylum Information Database (AIDA), op. cit.
34  Ibidem.
35  This corresponds to 3.7% of Istanbul’s population.
36  M. Chudziak, M. Marszewski, op. cit, s. 3.
37  O. Karaspan, Turkey’s Syrian Refugess – the Welcome Hades, https://www.brook-
ings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/11/25/turkeys-syrian-refugees-the-welcome-
fades/ (access 10.03.2020).
38  The Asylum Information Database (AIDA), op. cit.
39  S. Kınıklıoğlu, op. cit., p. 2.
40  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, TURKEY Syrian 
Refugee Resilience Plan 2018–2019,pp. 2–3, http://www.fao.org/fi leadmin/user_upload/
emergencies/docs/Fao-syrian-refugee-plan2018-19.pdf (access 10.03.2020).
41  D. Lepeska, How İmamoğlu betrayed Istanbul, https://ahvalnews.com/syrian-
refugees-turkey/how-imamoglu-betrayed-istanbul (access 10.03.2020).
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housing and jobs.42 Although most of the Syrians took the worst paid jobs, 
in the face of the economic crisis, it was perceived by some members of 
the local community as a reason for not having their own employment.
Turks’ concerns are also confi rmed by studies of Ximen Del Carpio 
and Mathis Wagner (2015), Oğuz Esen and Ayla Oğuş Binatlı (2017) 
and Mehmet Duruel (201743) regarding the impact of the increase in 
the number of refugees in Turkey on employment in the informal labor 
market. Analyzes showed that the illegal employment of refugees causes 
reduction of wages in the informal sector in Southeastern Anatolia and 
also displaces Turkish workers from it. Similarly, it could be seen in the 
case of Istanbul, which became the main direction of migration of Syrians. 
It is estimated that young Syrian refugees earn on average 27% less than 
their Turkish counterparts.44
The debate on the economic consequences of receiving Syrian refugees 
intensifi ed during the campaign before the parliamentary and presidential 
elections in 2018.45 The opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) has 
repeatedly called for the need to resettle Syrians to their homeland and 
discontinue their admission by Turkey. This opinion was expressed, 
among others, by one of the Turkish presidential candidates Muharrem 
İnce (CHP), who primarily tried to respond to Turks’ concerns over the 
presence of Syrian refugees. During the election campaign, M. İnce even 
made a promise to resettle Syrians to their own country.46 In one of the 
interviews before the presidential election, he commented on the decision 
made by the government, which allowed 70 000 Syrians to return to their 
homeland for the upcoming Muslim festival Eid al-Fitr and then re-
enter Turkey as a place of protection and permanent residence. According 
to İnce, “holiday trips to Syria” served as a confi rmation of the fact that 
refugees were safe there and could return home.47 Although his comments 
42  Z. Weise, Syrian refugees in Turkey face calls to return as public mood changes, 
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2018/03/27/syrian-refugees-turkey-
face-calls-return-public-mood-changes (access 10.03.2020).
43  O. Esen, A.O. Binatlı, The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Economy: 
Regional Labour Market Effects, „Social Sciences”, no. 6/2017, pp. 9–10.
44  K. Kirişci, G. Uysal Kolasin, op. cit.
45  R. Mohydin, Media Coverage, Perception and Evidence: The Economic Impact 
of Syrian Refugees in Turkey, p. 7, https://researchcentre.trtworld.com/images/fi les/re-
ports/EconomicImpactSyrianRefugees.pdf (access 1.06.2020).
46  JUSOOR for Studies, The Syrian Case In The Turkish Elections, p. 8, https://
www.jusoor.co/content_images/users/1/contents/687.pdf (access 1.06.2020).
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were subject to criticism from various environments, many users of social 
networks agreed with this position.48
During the 2018 presidential campaign, the incumbent President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also promised to send refugees to their homeland, 
but he expressed it in a far less resolute manner. Instead, he convinced 
voters that the naturalization of Syrians would help them in their effort 
to support themselves and thus remove the burden of their maintenance 
from the Turkish state.
The issue of Syrian citizenship was fi rst raised by R.T. Erdoğan 
as early as 2016. On 2nd July 2016 in Kilis, he stated that: “Turkey is 
a homeland for Syrians coming from Syria [...] and if some of them wish 
to become Turkish citizens, we will grant our Syrian brothers citizenship, 
and we will be able to pursue the case through a bureau we have 
established”.49 These words, which were said in a Turkish city where the 
number of Syrians is higher than the number of Turks, became a subject 
of heated public debate. Twitter users even started to use the hashtag 
#UlkemdeSuriyeliIstemiyorum (“I don’t want Syrians in my country”50), 
which emphasised their opposition to Syrian refugees. Most likely, as 
a result of the opposition of a signifi cant part of Turkish society to the 
admission of Syrians and the possibility of granting them citizenship, 
subsequent statements by the president were no longer as open and 
universal. Instead, he repeatedly confi rmed the possibility of granting 
citizenship only to specialists, businessmen and orphans.
The increasingly less favorable attitude of Turkish society towards the 
refugee and asylum seeker community51 began to cause greater problems 
for the authorities. This was demonstrated by the results of the elections 
for the Mayor of Istanbul in 2019, in which the candidate from the 
ruling party in Turkey (Justice and Development Party – AKP), Binali 
Yıldırım lost to the opposition candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu (CHP). The 
importance of this failure can be proved by the words of the president 
Erdoğan himself, who once said “whoever wins Istanbul, wins Turkey”.52 
Although the results of local government elections usually have a limited 
infl uence on the political directions of the country, their symbolism in 
48  Ibidem.
49  Enab Baladi, What’s New in Turkey with the Naturalization of the Syrians there?, 
https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2017/08/whats-new-turkey-naturalization-
syrians/#ixzz6O7VKDy3n (access 1.06.2020).
50  S. Girit, Turks hit back at Erdogan plan to give Syrians citizenship, https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-36704791 (access 1.06.2020).
51  D. Lepeska, op. cit.
52  M. Lowen, Erdogan’s party suffers blow after Istanbul re-run poll defekt, https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48739256 (access 10.03.2020).
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the case of Turkey is indisputable. As the history of this state has shown, 
the results of local government elections turned out to be the beginning of 
a new stage in the state policy.53 It primarily refers to the elections in 1994 
when R. Erdoğan took the offi ce of Mayor of Istanbul, then became the 
prime minister and a few years later the president. Together with his AKP 
party he has been continuously exercising power in the state since 2002. 
Shortly after the victory in June 2019, E. İmamoğlu himself assessed that 
the issue of refugees is a serious trauma for Turkey. He also linked the stay 
of refugees with economic problems of the state saying that: “There are 
many Syrians who work unregistered. [Turkey] must protect the interests 
of [its] people. [Syrians] can’t recklessly change the color of Istanbul”.54
E. İmamoğlu won the election, among others, in the conservative 
district of Fatih55 where the AKP’s results in the last four elections did 
not fall below 51%. Part of the party’s electorate, which this time showed 
its support to the opposition candidate, cited the failure of fi nalizing the 
return of the Syrians to their homeland by the ruling party as one of the 
two main reasons for this decision.56 Turkish researchers Ali Fisunoğlu 
and Deniz Sert showed in their analysis that refugees had a negative 
(but nonetheless insignifi cant) impact on the support for the AKP in the 
districts with a signifi cant concentration of refugees.57 Therefore, it can 
be assumed that in the face of the economic crisis, the funds directed 
by the AKP to provide for Syrians, caused gradual dissatisfaction among 
various social groups and were undoubtedly of utmost signifi cance for the 
results of local elections.
This can also be seen in the results of public opinion polls conducted 
since the beginning of the refugee crisis. For example, data from 2016 
showed that AKP voters assessed the impact of Syrian refugees on the 
economic opportunities of the Turkish population and the economy of 
the country less negatively and were more favorable towards government 
services for the refugees than voters of other political parties. Over half of 
53  G. Dalay, Istanbul Election: Remaking of Turkey’s New Political Landscape?, 
„SWP Comment”, no. 31/2019, p. 3. 
54  D. Lepeska, op. cit.
55  Yeni Şafak, 23 June 2019 İstanbul – Fatih Election Results, https://www.yenisa-
fak.com/en/23-haziran-istanbul-secimi/istanbul-fatih-ilcesi-secim-sonuclari (access 
10.03.2020).
56  BBC News, Seçim sonuçları: İstanbul Fatih’te AKP seçmeni İmamoğlu’nun zaferi 
için ne diyor? (Results of the election: What does AKP voter say about İmamoğlu’s victory in 
Fatih?), https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-48742269 (access 10.03.2020).
57  B. Esen, S. Gumuscu, Killing Competitive Authoritarianism Softly: The 2019 Lo-
cal Elections in Turkey, „South European Society and Politics”, vol. 24, no. 3/2019, 
p. 322.
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the respondents also perceived the stay of the Syrians as temporary and 
hoped that after resolving the confl ict, refugees would return to their 
country.58 Optimism in this matter, however, gradually faded. In the 
Kadir Has Universiy survey from 2019, over 70% of respondents (70,9%) 
claimed to have stopped believing in the return of Syrian refugees to 
Syria at all.59
Numerous public opinion polls also show a gradual decline in public 
support for the very idea of accepting refugees. Research by İstanbul 
Bilgi University Center for Migration Research (CMR), published in 
2018, showed, among others, that a signifi cant proportion of Turks is in 
favor of sending refugees to their home country, and that this solution is 
supported by voters from all the leading political parties. In 2018, as many 
as 83.2% of respondents supporting the AKP were in favor of sending 
refugees back (also among voters of other political parties this percentage 
is high and oscillates between 75.9% and 94.9%).60
Analyzes conducted by Turkish researchers show that the mass infl ux 
of Syrians into Turkey caused only a slight decrease in support for the 
AKP and had a statistically insignifi cant impact on the election results.61 
In the case of the 2019 March and June elections, the results gave a clear 
signal that a part of the previously loyal AKP electorate, for some reason 
did not support the party this time.62 Although the refugee case is probably 
not the main reason for the electoral failure, along with the economic 
crisis of the state and security issues, it can be considered at least as an 
indirect factor leading to the fall in AKP’s support in the recent elections 
in Istanbul or Ankara.
The stay of Syrians in Turkey is not welcomed today by the large 
majority of Turks. According to research by scientists from Kadir Has 
University, most citizens of this country do not express satisfaction with 
the stay of Syrians. Answering a question: “To what extent are you content 
58  O. Altindag, N. Kaushal, Do Refugees Impact Voting Behavior in the Host 
Country? Evidence from Syrian Refugee Infl ows in Turkey, „Discussion Paper Series”, 
no. 10849/2017, p. 14.
59  Kadir Has Üniversitesi, #TE2019. Türkiye Eğilimleri – 2019 15 Ocak 2020 
(TE2019. Turkey Trends – 2019 January 15, 2020), p. 82, https://www.khas.edu.tr/sites/
khas.edu.tr/files/inline-files/TE2019_TUR_BASIN_15.01.20%20WEB%20versi-
yon%20powerpoint_0.pdf (access 10.03.2020).
60  İstanbul Bilgi University Center for Migration Research, Dimensions of Po-
larization in Turkey. February 6th, 2018, Ankara, p. 63, https://goc.bilgi.edu.tr/media/
uploads/2018/02/06/dimensions-of-polarizationppt_Tz7XeBg.pdf (access 10.03.2020).
61  O. Altindag, N. Kaushal, op. cit.
62  H. Duran, What do Statistics Tell us about the Istanbul Elections?, https://thenew-
turkey.org/what-do-statistics-tell-us-about-the-istanbul-elections (access 10.03.2020).
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with the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey?”, the surveyed Turks 
overwhelmingly replied „I am discontent” (in 2019 – 67.7%, in 2018 – 
61%, in 2017 – 54.5%). Refering to another question: “What kind of policy 
should Turkey adopt towards refugees?”, most of the respondents replied 
“Should stop accepting refugees” (in 2019 – 57.6%, in 2018 – 46.3%, in 
2017 – 46.4%63). Among the most signifi cant reasons for dissatisfaction, 
the respondents cited Syrians’ tendency to commit crimes, the lack of 
peace of the local community, growing unemployment caused by illegal 
labor, the destruction of national identity, the use of the state’s possibilities 
granting privileges to Syrian refugees and, fi nally, cultural differences.64 
Syrian refugees are therefore perceived by the Turkish people mainly as 
a community that disturbs order, steal jobs and is a threat to national 
identity.
It is very likely that the attitude of Turkish people towards Syrians 
and the results of the 2019 local elections infl uenced the announcement 
of a policy which further specifi ed the conditions of Syrian refugees’ stay 
in Turkey by the AKP government. Since the beginning of the migration 
crisis, Syrian refugees did not have free access to the labor market and 
their possibility of moving within Turkey was limited. In order to leave 
the province in which the refugee was registered, he needed a written 
consent.65 Initially, this was done to a limited extent. However, shortly 
after the local elections (July 2019), the Turkish authorities announced 
that Syrians who were in Istanbul and were registered elsewhere had 
to return or leave the city until 20th August 2019.66 As a result, Syrians 
not registered in any of the Turkish provinces could be deported back to 
Syria (where Turkey had created enclaves for the returnees67). According 
to researchers from Refugee International, fi rst information about the 
deportations of Syrian men began to appear as early as in July 2019. 
This was followed by an intensive investigation of identity documents, 
including districts with large concentrations of Syrian population. 
Turkish authorities reported that the action was directed against 12 000 
illegal migrants, primarily from Afghanistan, Pakistan and other third 
countries. In fact, it has been documented that hundreds of Syrians were 
deported to their country during this period. Those who could not show 
63  Center for Turkish Studies of Kadir Has University, #TDP2019. Public Percep-
tions on Turkish Foreign Policy, 4 July 2019, p. 84, https://www.khas.edu.tr/sites/khas.
edu.tr/fi les/inline-fi les/TDP-2019_BASINENG_FINAL.PDF (access 10.03.2020).
64  Kadir Has Üniversitesi, op. cit., p. 81.
65  I. Leghtas, op. cit., p. 7.
66  Returns were extended to October 30, 2019.
67  U. Farooq, N. Bulos, op. cit.
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their registration document were urged to sign voluntary repatriation 
forms and return to Syria.68
As Suat Kınıklıoğlu notes, although the AKP is aware of the fact that the 
probability of Syrian refugees returning to their country is small, the loss 
of voters in local elections has forced the party to show the public that the 
government has full control over the situation.69 Therefore, the Operation 
Source of Peace, launched in October 2019, justifi ed the need to resettle 
refugees to northern Syria and increased Turkish public support for the 
operation itself. In the months preceding the intervention, Turkey convinced 
international community and its own society of its humanitarian character 
and the need to build a buffer zone to enable the resettlement of some Syrian 
refugees. However, according to the European Union, the operation was of 
a military nature and is the third, after the “Euphrates Shield” (2016–2017) 
and “Olive Branch” (2018) armed intervention in Syria.70
The Turkish people themselves express a slightly different attitude 
to the intervention. Answering the question: “Do you support the 
peace operation that Turkey has begun in Syria?”, as many as 75.6% of 
respondents answered affi rmatively (only 24.4% had a different opinion71). 
In turn, refering to the question: “What do you think is the main reason 
for starting the operation?” the second most popular answer was the 
need to create a safety zone and place refugees there, which was cited by 
a quarter of the respondents (25.6%) (more respondents cited the need 
to ensure security at the border as the main reason – 42.6%). Therefore, 
the results of this research clearly indicate that, in the opinion of the 
Turks, Operation Source of Peace in Syria was related to the possibility of 
resettling Syrians there. 
Conclusions
Issues concerning Syrian migration to Turkey can be considered in 
two differnet contexts. First of all, it can be assumed that Syrians are 
a community from the same (Muslim) civilization circle that fi nds its 
place in Turkey without much social confl ict with the local population. It 
68  I. Leghtas, op. cit., p. 10.
69  S. Kınıklıoğlu, op. cit., p. 2.
70  European Parliament, Turkey’s military operation in Syria and its impact on rela-
tions with the EU (Brifi ng), p. 1, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Brief-
ing-642284-Turkeys-military-operation-Syria-FINAL.pdf (access 10.03.2020), p. 1.
71  Areda, Barış Pınarı Operasyonu Algı Araştırması Ekim 2019 (Operation Source 
of Peace’s Perception Survey October 2019), p. 6, https://www.areda.com/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/Barış-Pınarı-Operasyonu-Basın-Bülteni.pdf (access 10.03.2020).
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seems, however, that such a way of thinking is justifi ed only in places where 
clusters of „foreign” Syrian population are smaller and where their impact 
on the life of the local community is very small. Second of all, considering 
the processes taking place in Turkey, it seems more reasonable to adopt 
another way of looking at consequences of migrations. This way should 
refer to changes that have taken place in other European countries.
The number of Syrian migrants accounts for a signifi cant proportion 
of the population in some Turkish cities. Their share in the labor market, 
mainly informal, is noticeable. This situation is primarily associated with 
low-paid jobs, poor working conditions and exploitation. Some Syrians 
are not insured and their living conditions are very bad. Nevertheless, 
competition in the labor market in the form of cheap Syrian labor is seen 
by unemployed Turks as an obstacle for fi nding their own employment.
Along with the increase in the number of refugees in Turkey, the state 
policy towards them has changed. Turkey, which initially prepared TAC 
Temporary Accommodation Camps for Syrians, began to focus on providing 
them with access to public goods (such as health services) and basic needs. 
However, high costs of maintaining refugees in the context of the economic 
crisis have not been positively assessed by the local community, for which 
the Syrians, apart from “taking jobs” are also a serious burden on the state 
budget. Syrian people, especially in cities, undergo a ghettoization process 
and become groups which are clearly separate from the local community. 
The dislike of the Syrians was mainly refl ected in social media, where 
numerous actions were manifested by the demonstration a negative 
attitude towards the presence of refugees in Turkey.
The issue of refugees is one of the factors that have had a negative 
impact on the perception of government policies and the AKP election 
results in recent local government elections. Before the elections, some 
politicians called for the need to send Syrians back to their homeland. 
After the defeat in Istanbul and Ankara in 2019, the AKP government 
took measures to specify the policy towards Syrian refugees. A military 
operation in Syria, justifi ed by the need for creation of a safety zone in 
which refugees could be located, was started. Authorities also began 
controlling whereabouts of Syrians and, as reported by human rights 
organizations, started to send them back to their homeland.
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